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SIXTY YEARS WITH THE NACA AND NASA
1915-1975  
t ^^	 c3I	 Eugene M. Emme
^^gfi^	 cW	 NASA Historian
M ^^^^,^^Q ti Winter Colloquium SeriesCo Langley Research Center
Hampton, Virginia
February 9, 1976
One value of the Bicentennial Year is already being served,
and rather painlesi5ly as seems evident by the amazing size of this
audience. This is veyy pleasing. History is not a vogue subject
of study in American schools at almost any level. Lousy Americans
tend not to be history minded, which includes scientists and engi-
neers. A few intuitive scientists, engineers and managers become
interested in the history of their own field of specialization and
beyond their own career horizons. By definition, someone genuinely
history-minded is mainly interested in re-creating knowledge of the
past and not shaping the future. When someone says history proves
something, you had better listen very carefully.
American historians, for their part, have not been too helpful
either. They have not been greatly interested in the history of
science and technology until very recently. And, they tend not
to be interested in recent events. So here in the twentieth cem-
	
tury, when science and technology have increasingly been a great
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influence on social change, in war and in peace, we have this
dichotomy between the busy makers of history in the fields of
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science and technology, and the historians relatively uninterested
in science and technology.	 The history of the NACA and NASA fell,
between these two	 stools, at least until the spectacular Apollq
achievements on live TV.
The Bicentennial now provides us with the rare opportunity
to examine the 43-year	 history of the National Advisory Committee
k
€r
f for Aeronautics and the 17--years of the National. Aeronautics and
Space Administration for its own sake.
	 It is a legitimate subject
for discussion.	 I hope that what I might say about this continuum t
s
rr
of experience will be helpful to some of ,you.	 Some,parts of the
t
history of the NACA and NASA obviously some people in the audience
know more about than I may ever know.
	
History is only as good as
its sources.	 When you hear a historian say something, find out
_ the sources for his generalizations. 	 What are his hypotheses, t	 `
what are his inferences or his facts upon which he bases his
thoughts?
r
r It is not a historical accident that at the oldest laboratory
of NASA we have a spot here in the Bicentennial Series to look at
}
i history.
I will not bore you with the obvious on how important the
i technology of flight has been in recent American history -- whether
it was Worlu War !I or preserving global peace, or the changed view
,i of man upon the world itself because of "spaceship earth," as =
viewed for the first time from above the moon by the Apollo 8r
astronauts.	 The price of a ticket will carry you by air to the
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far corners of th% earth. We now also know we live in a dynamic
universe. We are catching the sun's rays to try to heat our
houses. This is not new to knowledge but the horizons and the
	 i
problems have changed. The whole history of flight fz.om man
starting to fly like a bird safely, which the Wright brothers
contributed in controlled flight, has led us to the moon. With
the Space Shuttle we are now entering the phase where practical
space transportation hopefully will become economic, and not just
	 1
heroin and novel.
	 f
It has only been 360 years since Galileo first pointed a
.j	 telescope at the moon, about the time this part of the, world was
a	 ,
first getting settled as a matter of fact. Galileo's sketches of
	 j
the large craters on the Moon was the discovery of « `New World,"
and was a seminal event in the rise of modern science. It was
	
R'I
just 66 years after the Wright brothers demonstrate controlled
}	 flight in 1903, man first set foot upon the surface of the Moon.
This was just six and one-half years ago.
}
One historian of technology, who has been most helpful to us
in NASA, is Melvin Kranzberg, editor of Te^hnology and Culture,
3 quarterly of the Society for the History,
 of Technology. Kranzberg
has suggested that the school children of the twenty-fifth century
(the 25th century is Buck Roger's century for those unfamiliar with
the older comics), that-the school children will chant the doggerel
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in their classrooms: "In nineteen-hundred-and-sixty-nine, Steil
	 er
Armstrong leaped for all mankind."' The point here'is that the
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Ifirst date of history memorized by most of us, was anchored by
"the ocean blue" and "fourteen-hundred-and-ninety-two."
The recency of the history we are looking at today is re-
inforced by the fact that the first employee of the NACA, Dr.
1
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John F. Victory, just departed this world a little over a year
ago.	 People'here today have shaken hands with Orville Wright and
"
Neil Armstrong.
	 The entire experience of practical flight has been
confined within the memory of p•^ople still Uving, although increas-
ingly a precious few.
	 It has been a working assumption of the NASA f
historical program, besides getting all the documents, that his- ^I
tory passed on to posterity should have the benefits of the inputs
.I
i
of as many of the key participants as possible.
	 But I suspect that
there are probably some academic historians attempting to write
NASA's history just like everyone involved is now dead. 	 One man's
memory is not history, it is a memory. 	 But these memories can be
most helpful to the historian.
Hugh L. Dryden once conveyed	 a thought which coupled the i
thrust of a research engineer with the historian's method, when he
t said in his Wilbur Wright Lecture in 1949: "The most important tool
4	 in aeronautical research, even more than the large wind tunnel, is
"	 the human mind." History too is an intellectual process.
You will have	 opportunity after the 4th of July to visit
the hew National Air and Space Musei , across t'_ a street from NASA	 -
y
Headquarters. It will be simply a stunning exhibition of the prime
artifacts in the history of flight technology. Behind each one of 	 xi4
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them is a human story, one involving the details ► conception, design,
construction, test, modification, and application in each airplane
	
}	
and spacecraft. About the same time this.great historical display
will,be open, the Viking lander.hopeful.,ly will be setting down
upon the surface of the planet Mars. It may answer some questions
but it'will likely.rai,se many more questions.
To get your mental time machine turned back, I could ask who
was the first American to fly? The bicentennial of the first
American to become airborne on a man-made device will not occur
until 1984. (1984 was the 30-year projected date for George
r9
	
`, â 	 Orwell's forecast of things to come). Who was the first American
to fly? His name was Edward Warren. He was a 13-year old boy
persuaded to ride a tethered 30-foot hot-air balloon. His brief
up and down voyage on the balloon of Peter Carnes of Bladensburg,
Maryland, is mentioned only in the Baltimore newspapers of the day,
and only several out-of-print histories. This flight happened,
perhaps significantly, within a year of the first Montgolfier
balloon flights in France in 1783. The flight of Edward Warren
	
k'	 preceded the so-called premier balloon flight in America, that of
Blanchard from behind Independence Hall in Philadelphia in 1794.
j1 It was witnessed by George Washington and his entire cabinet, so
i^
it is in all the history books. To get your time machine turned
^i
back, be it noted that to Frenchmen in 17,83, the first balloon
flights were regarded as man's historic fulfillment of his dream
of flight since the beginning of recorded history. Yet we have to
I
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keep in perspective that the Wright brothers developed the first
practical flying machine, and the Cerman V-2 of World War II was
the first large practical liquid fuel rocket, One of our Presi-
dents referred to Apollo 11 in July 1969, as the greatest event!
in human history since "The Creation." Who knows what man in the
twenty-fifth century will say about 1969?
THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
FOR AERONAUTICS
We will have to waltz ti.rough the history of the NACA and
NASA, touching only upon a few highlights. Fundamental questions
of who, what, where, 'when, argd why on all major aspects of this
sixty year history simply cannot be fleshed out in such a short
time, even if I knew everything whi r-h a don't. l
Why was the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
created? To make a complex story short, the NACA was created
after the beginning of World War I in Europe and because there
was(an "aeronautics gap." The land of the Wright Brothers had
fallen behind aeronautical progress in all of the major nations
of the world. It was realized in 1913, after a visit to the
.i	 4
k.
laboratories, of Europe by Jerome C. Hunsaker and Frank Zahm, that
all the leading nations, before the guns of August began firing,
had crea-1hed national aeronautical laboratories. Hunsaker had been
detailed by the U.S. Navy to teach the first courses in aeronautics
	
on"
at MIT and Zahm had been placed in charge of Dr. Langley's labora-
tory back of the Smithsonian. Despite the best efforts Smithsonian
A
i
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Secretary Walcott,, and Alexander Graham Bell, both members of the
National Academy of Sciences, they were unable to gat approval
in Wash,!,ngton for the creation of a Federally-fund d aeronautical
laboratory. With the outbreak of World War I, and the endorsement
of Acting Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, the legis-
lation creating the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
was added as a rider to the Naval Appropriations Act of March 1915.
I have not documented very well the plight of Americana aviation
before World War I. Two illustrations will suffice here. First,
the entire, operational air force of the Army Signal Corps, the 1st
Aero Squadron, was assigned to support the primitive actions against
Pancha-Villa in Mexico in 1916. It was not'shot down by Pancho-
Villa's forces, it just wore itself out and was destroyed by its own
operations. Secondly, no aircraft of American design and manu-
facture flew in combat in World War I. American airmen flew French
and British aircraft,, Spads and Sopwith Camels. 	 If the war had
lasted a couple of years longer, why of course American aircraft
with the "Liberty" engine would have had quite an effect. The
,political goal to "blacken the skies over Berlin" with aircraft
produced by American industry never came about. There were many
Investigations after the war why this had happened, which is another
story. The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics made some
notable policy decisions during the war, and the Aircraft Proving
Ground was opened here at Langley Field for Army, Navy, and NACA
units. But the first NACA wind tunnel did not begin operations,
and the Langley Memorial Aeronautical Laboratory was not dedicated
-7-
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until 1920. By that time the Army Air Service had moved their
flight test operations to ,Dayton,,Ohio,,and the Navy had moved
their flying boats to 'Norfolk.
The charter of trae National Advisory Committee for Aero-
nautics was a classic document. Its few phrases served well, and
may be familiar to you because part of it was always found on the
desk of a Director of the Langley Laboratory. I'd guess that
during the past 17 years I have been asked at least 50 times for
the precise warding or location of the text of the charter of the
NACA.3
a
The authority established the Advisory Committee for Aero-
nautics, not to exceed 12 members: two each from the aeronautics
branch of both the Army and the Navy, one each for the Weather
Bureau, the Bureau of Standards, and the Smithsonian; with five
knowledgeable persons (meaning from industry or academe). At
its first meeting, it added the word "'National." It was later
expanded to 17 members. Members were " to serve without compen-
sation." (That's one way to'get legislation passed!) And:
"That it shall be the duty of the Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics to supervise and direct
the scientific study of the problems of flight,
with a view to their practical solution, and to
determine the _problems which should be experimentally
attacked, and to discuss their solution and their
application."
The legislation also specified that the Committee may direct and
conduct research and experiment in aeronautics in "a laboratory
or laboratories." "The sum-of $5,000 a year, or so much thereof
-8-
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as may be necessary, for five years is hereby appropriated..." It
provided that an annual report be submitted to the Congress through
the President. The Annual Report came to be prepared with meti-
culous care as if the life of the NACA depended upon it. Secretary
of Commerce Herbert Hoover tried to get NACA transferred to the
Bureau of Standards, a threat which was revived regularly. Some
members of the U. S. Army Air Service had eyes on NACA too. But
by the time of Lindbergh's trans-Atlantic ;Tight in 1927, the
Langley Laboratory had made contributions to both the Army and
Navy. 1927 was the year the first Langley Inspection was held,
a most effective means of acquainting the aviation community with
the work of the NACA. Moreover, NACA's technical_ reports had
gained reputation internationally. It had a Paris Office under
John Ide, and NACA's Office of Technical Intelligence kept up with
worldwide developments in the technology of Flight, the military
air services, and the aircraft industry during the rap'.d develop-
ments of the 1930 1 s. This was the "golden period" of NACA contri-
butions with a view to their practical solution of the prob1cwts of
flight,
NACA was really an independent agency. Idembers of the Main
Committee were appointed by the President. But the Committee
elected its own Chairman (he was not approved by-the Congress).
The Committee hired the Director of Aeronautical Research, who
managed the internal organization of the NACA. The laboratories
of the NACA responded to the quidance with resolutions of * the Main
-9-
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Committee. Of course, the Committee really gave national focus
upon the problems of aeronautical, science. It represented the
needs of the Army and Navy Air Services, the Weather Bureau, ----
this national focus to aeronautics waui rather rare on a particular
field of endeavor in the Federal establishment, almost until the
creation of the Atomic Energy Commission after World War 11. A
high compliment was paid the NACA when it retained sovereignty
over aeronautics when the OSRD was created in 1940, to mobilize
scientists out of uniform for World War 11.
The work of the labioratories, as I will not have time to
elaborate, and which Langley under Dr. Henry Reid was the only
one for twenty-six years, responded to the guidance of the Main
Committer; through the Director of Aeronautical Research. 3 But the
reputation of the NACA to solve the practical problems of flight
meant that many problems were brought directly to Langley by people
from industry'and the military services. The Laboratories did the
work of the NACA, and there are several books you can examine for
r
part of this story. 4 Langley became the" Imother laboratory" of
the NACA with the creation of the Ames and Lewis Laboratories
during World War 1I, and later the units at Wallopo, Virginia,
and Edwards, California, not to forget Project .Mercury much later
that eventually became the Johnson Space Center.5
The charter of the NACA became sz;mewhat restrictive as youA,
n- a
have this great convergence of new technologies of flight —--that
which stemmed from Robert H. Goddard and the first practical liquid 	 ,' ► ,
 m fl
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fuel rocket in the German V-2, and jet propulsion for aircraft.
Everyone learned that Nazi Germany set out to build a better NACA
and did during World war 11
	
a dictatorship can be as efficient
in basic research as a democracy. By the time all these new
technologies begin to converge in the 1950'x, "aeronautics" meant
much more than the focus on aerodynamics, airfoils, and instru-
mentation. The work, of the PARD (Pilotless Aircraft Rewearch
Division) of Langley under Robert Gilruth started its notable
research using rocketry to get at the problems of high speed
flight. And, the notable rocket research airplane program,
start;Lng with the supersonic X- 1^ led NACA to the threshold of
space. NACA Director Dryden was a Little concerned when William 	 {
,g
k:
O'Sullivan got involved with the air density satellite experiment
of the International Geophysical Year, but decided that a program
approved by the President would suffice.. At the same time, the
industry and the military services started bringing their problems
}	 related to high-speed military jet aircraft and later guided missiles
r
i
	 to the NACA, The "view to their practical solution" continued to
prevail during the late 1940's and early 19501s,,
r.
The classic example of NACA's restrictive charter, was illus-
trated on the day of Sputnik in October 1957 at Lewis Laboratory.
Executive Secretary John F. Victory heard the dry runs for the 	
0
Triennial Inspection, which each year he carefully made it his job
s
to be sure that every station on on the tour, and every man at each
k	 ;
station, had his presentation down letter perfect to impress the
jmw7r `
UP's, including the Congressmen. He categorically demanded that
all references to space	 particularly one paper on ion pro-
pulsion in space, which was pretty far out as regards early appli-
cation in space	 be deleted. "NACA will be finished if the
Congress ever finds out we are working on the Buck Roger's stuff,"
he said. That Friday evening, October 4 1 1957, news that the
Russians had launched the world's first earth satellite became
known. When the Lewis Inspection began the next week, all refer-
ences to space were restored. Abe Silverstein even made the New
York Times on the advanced propulsion studies underway at NACA
E;	 Lewis. Here at Langley, Max Faget had been unable to get approval
for a NACA satellite using solid propellant stages in a booster
rocket.
It is difficult to illustrate in few words how the NACA
operated. It had a great reputation. The Committee was not the
NACA organization in the laboratories. The Technical Committees,
in ]Fey disciplinespalso had nationwide membership and served as a
clearing house for information on problems and progress on the
frontiers of flight. You name a prominent person in the technology
of flight, and you will likely find at one time or another he was
on a technical committee of the NACA. This would include Robert
Seamans, and even our current Administrator, James C. Fletcher.
These technical committees functioned effectively. General "Hap"
Arnold could leave a meeting of the Main Committee, put on his
	
Army	
a 1{
-Air Force hat and direct Wright Field to do something that the NACA
was not doing, or vice versa. One must be careful to distinguish
-12-
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the work of these various components of the NACA, which, in effect,
were to lead to the placement of the civilian space mission atop
the NACA with the creation of NASA. One big change, of course, wa*,,
t
that the NASA had a Headquarters instead of just the "Washington
Office" of the NACA, and it no longer had a Main Advisory Committee
but reported directly to the White House.
It should be .-yted that the Chairmen of the NACA were always
very strong persons over the years.
° Dr. Joseph Ames (1927-1939) of John Hopkins, served as
4
Chairman of the Executive Committee from 1919 until becoming
Chairman of the NACA in 1927. It was Dr. Ames, Dr. Thompson
remind& me, who said; "The business of the NACA is research, and 	 )
we c,4id to our business." The NACA did not get into the practical
design and systems development of aircraft until the research air-
planes.
° Dr. Vannevar Bush of MIT (1939-1941) used the Technical.
x
Committee systems of the NACA in setting up OSRD. This mobilized
4
scientists for World War 11, except for 'NACA in aeronautics and 	 i
the MAnhattan Project for the atomic bomb. He wrote in his memoirs
that when one moves to Washington, you must find a man like John F.
Victory if you expect to get anything done. 6
° Dr. Jerome C. Hunsaker (1941-1956) of MIT was also a very
1
strong figure, one of the designers of the Navy NC-4 which flee, , the
a Atlantic right after World War I.' The NACA drew from 523 persons
in 1939, to 6,800 in 1945. Once the fix-up of military aircraft
fi
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during World War 11 was completed, the NACA got back to its basic
work of fundamental research.
° Dr. Jimmy Doolittle, the last Chairman (1955-1558), who
also was a key eigure in getting NASA created atop of the NACA in
1958. He was also Chairman of the Scientific Advisory Board of
the Air Force.
Each Chairman of the NACA testified before the Appropriations
Committees of the Congress with the Director of the NACA.
Examining briefly some of the leading peoples of the NACA may
	
k	 permit me to bring the NACA story to life a little within a few
minutes.
The first employee J,n`19151 was Jahn P. Victory. He was a
court reporter hired to record the deliberations of the NACA. He
shared an office with Colonel. "Billy" Mitchell before the U. S.
entered World War I. John Victory developed a religious passion
about the NACA; its mission and its people. He fought the Civil
Service Commission. He fought the Selective Service during World
War TI to prevent NACA people from being drafted — the "one day
soldiers" resulted as NACA people were placed in the Army Air Force
	
y	 Reserve (Naval Reserve at Ames) for the duration. John F. Victory
most effectively functioned with the Congress. He would visit
	
1	 every new-elected Senator or Congressman, introduce himself, and
F explain what the NACA was, and offered the help of NACA on any
aviation problem that might arise. When the famous NACA cowling
increased the air speed of air-cooled-engined aircraft, he worked
up dollar figures' ,that showed that this saving in time and gasoline
-14-
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^. for commercial operations would be a greater amount than the entire
funding provided the NACA from the beginning.	 NACA 'had only two
Directors, Dr. George Lewis	 (1924-1945) and Dr. Hugh L. Dryden
(1947-1958), and they ruled over the NACA research program. 	 flat i
it was John Victory who oversaw the housekeeping details of dollars,
personnel, and lots of little important things. r
There is no biography of Dr. George Lewis, Director of the
NACA for twenty-pne years (1924 zl945Y.	 He was a mechanical engineer
who became a strong research manager, smoked cigars and wore pinoe- 6
1
Iez glasses.
	
He was constantly concerned that the work goii.g on at r
Langley was practical, and he maintained cordial relations with the {'
entire aviation community, particularly in Washington.
	 He came to w	 ^,
^+
Mf
the Langley 	almost every
 week:	 He could
	
et on the
	 Y	 Y	 .^	 g -
Washington--Norfolk ferry boat at 6 PM in the evening, and be at
k
Point Comfort at 6 AM the next day.	 He'd spend the day at Langley,
then return to Washington that evening.
	 He always occupied State-
room 13, and had a special shutter device to pull moving air through
his stateroom during hot weather.
	
When he flew the Hindenburg to
fs
Europe to examine Germany's new laboratories in 1937, he reported
to the staff of General Hap Arnold what he had found.
	 He corre-
sponded with Robert Goddard in the 1920's and Charles Lindbergh in
Europe in the 1930'x.
	 Lindbergh was very instrumental in pushing the
the state of the art to the 550 mph airplane for the possible coming
war, and was instrumental in the dreatian of the Ames and Lewis
laboratories.
	 in 1941, returning from Langley, Lewis told his NACA
driver awaiting him (Mike Cushman): "It was a sad day at Langley
f .
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` yesterday.	 Langley just went over 1,000 people.
	 When you get "hat
many people you begin to get inefficient."
	
Dr. Lewis also reported
r once that he had discovered that Abe Silverstein had another wind
tunnel, using a boiler off the Iwaboratory some place.	 Everyone
seems to agree that Dr. Lewis killed himself by hard work during
World War II.
Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, the second NACA Director (1947-1958),
was a , scientist, who got his Ph.D. at the age of 20 while working
at the Bureau of Standards, a student of Joseph Ames. It is indeed
fitting that the Dryden Flight Research Center will be dedicated
next month.	 Dryden and Lyman J. Briggs began propeller-tip aero-
dynamic studies in 1924	 compressibility was reached at 450 mph,
and the flow of air separated from the air foil.
	 He became a layy
d
Methodist preacher, spoke every Sunday somewhere, did not smoke
KC •
anything,-and drank ginger ale. 	 .Briggs and Dryden attained inter-
`-
M
national stature for their NACA reports in 1926 on research on a
3-stage, turbine-driven, compressor at GE, Lynn, Mass.
	 Later they
ran tests at Mach .5 to Mach 1.08. and observed a shock wave one-
half-inch in front of an air foil. 	 Dryden headed an interagency'
committee on low-cost housing technology in the 1930's, and did
the famous study proving that a baseball did indeed curve when
properly pitched.
Dryden had a photographic eye and instant recall. During
World War II, he wos:ked bn guided-missiles for the OSRD, parti-
cularly on the "Bat," a guided bomb. He was the Scientific
k 16-
t
x r
'	 Director of the Army Air Force Scientific Advisory Group under
*.tck
Theodore von Karman in 1944-1945. The von Karman group found 4.4
A
wind tunnels in Germany, and made recommendations oA R&D which
served the country importantly. One of his major post-war jobs was
working out the unitary Wind Tunnel Plan. While the NACA lost its
relative monopoly of wind tunnel technology, the Unitary Wind Tunnel
Plan insured that eve,,?y Federally-funded wind tunnel in NACA or the
USAF was not duplicative. Dryden also refused to be Chairman but
generally prepared the agendas for the North Atlantic Treaty
Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and Development (AGARD).
As the Director of the NACA, of course, the working out of the
research airplane program, with the Air Force and the Navy, became
an important means of extending the research profiles of high-speed.
Importantly, Dryden was close to the decision-making process in the
White House, when NASA was created. And, most importantly, it was
Deputy Administrator Dryden who retained the role of the Research
Center in the NASA. It was testimony enough that both of NASA's
first two Administrators, Dr. T. Keith Glennan and James E. Webb
accepted their posts provided that Hugh L. Dryden would remain,as
Deputy Administrator 6f NASA. When he died in 1965, he was never
really replaced. Congressional Cormittees sometimes did not agree
with hi,m, some people in the NACA even regarded him as conservative;
they came to know that what Hugh Dryden, the NACA or the NASA pro-
mised to do, indeed was accomplished. He was, in his quiet way, the
most brillant intellect I have ever met. He never said "no." But
E^
P	 c.
he would suggest a better alternative to a proposal which had the
same effect.?
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am sorry I do not have time to review the role of the NACA
laboratory directors -- Hen ry Reid, Smith DeFrance, and Ray Sharp.
THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND
SPACE ADMINISTRATION
9
t,
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The basic historical question is why was the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration created'?—is a complex story but
can be easily answered. It was a result of an evolving national
decision process to create a civilian space agency atop the NACA
after the Russians launched the first satellite of the earth on
r.
October 4, 1957. Sputnik was a shocking technological surprise to i
the American people. It was no surprisa to the people in NACA or
+ 4	 the rest of the aerospace community. The space first was certainly
novel, but it took a while before space exploration took a trajec•-
tory of its own. The idea that the Russians had a si , .perior rocket
which could carry a thermonuclear warhead at intercontinental
 3
ranges, could not be explained away. So Sputnik was a symbol of
a "technological Pearl Harbor" in the military sense, and priority
1
r	 efforts were devoted by the White House and the Congress to get on
with ballistic missile development and possible space projects to
r'	 help insure peace. In his first major speech after Sputnik, Pre-
.	 ^	
r
sident Eisenhower said: "What the world needs today is not a giant
6
leap into space, but a giant step toward peace." He tried to ex-
plain why he had decided in 1955 that the U.S. satellite to be
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V
launched for the IGY would not be lofted by a military missile for
the sake of international science.
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It took a year until NASA officially began, and tb- process of
M
the national decision to create a civilian space agency led to the
passage of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958. This
is a remarkable legislative charter, which I may assume most of you
may have read. You should. It preserved the aeronautical research
mission of the NACA, and expanded the scope of the requirements of
space flight technology to be served "with a view to their practical
solution." Space operations imposed even greater requirements for
reliable performance than airplanes, and particularly when men flew
in spacecraft.
Why NASA was created evolved after the impact of the Russian
sputniks percolates over several months. Even before Sputnik,
a
President Eisenhower had opted strongly for keeping space peaceful,
and concerning which he pounded the table when I interviewed him in
1966, saying: "What was more important than keeping space peaceful?"
The ICBM program began before the 1GY satellite program, but Eisen-
hower sought unsuccessfully to establish an "open skies" accord with
the Soviet Union. With Sputnik, the Russian satellite did-open up
the skies for nonmilitary over-flights, and in the name of inter-
national science. Eisenhower appointed a Science Advisor in the
White House after Sputnik II carried a little Russian dog into
f:j	 orbit early in November 1957. He named James R. Killian to this
G	
.^ 	
Y
r^.	 post. While military concerns prevailed, the thought that the NACA
x	 might be the best way to get started on nonmilitary space efforts
early appeared. It was mentioned at a Saturday luncheon in the
	
a,
r	 White House mess at a meeting in late November 1957, by four "Dims
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yJames R. Killian, James Fisk of Bela Telephone Laboratories and
a member, of the Presi+tent's Science Advisory Committee, James
McCormack of the Air Force, Atomic Energy Commission, and later
MIT, and James Doolittle, Chairman of NACA and of the Scientific
Advisory Board of the Air Force. 	 The point was discussed that
if the Air Force got the ballistic missile job, could the Army do
the space job, or vice versa? 	 It was McCormack and Fisk who agreed
that NACA, with its experience in aerospace technology and effective
relations with the military services, industry, and the technical
community might be a good way to get started with minimum disiup-
tion.	 The IGY space effort could be continued, the nonmilitary
P
1
satellites and projects of the military services could be assured
S}
p ^
of gaining scientific results, and the military rocketry could be
Rk	 v	 ' l
used for these nonmilitary purposes. 	 At the same time, military
aspects of space could remain in the Department of Defense.
	 Noth-
ing happened while the NACA prepared to play a research engineering 	 y'
role in space technology that it had already started to do, addi-
tional to aeronautical research.
	 Even after the Vanguard blew up
on the pad in December 1957, nothing tangible happened until the
	 p	 '
Army launched Ex2lorer I on January 31, 1958, and Eisenhower
directed Killian to come up with a recommended space organization.
In the meantime, the DOD had created the Advanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA) to get atop the "missile mess" in the Pentagon and
serve as an interim focal point for getting missile and space
projects underway.	 Additionally, the American Rocket Society and
the Rocket and Satellite Research Panel had recommended strongly
-20-
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that full space accomplishments would best be served by a non-
military space agency. And, in the meantime, Lyndon B. Johnson,
Majority Leader of the Senate, had become a champion of a vigorous
nonmilitary space grogram for its own sake. Z have been spending
the past several years documenting in full detail this full story on
how NASA was created, and how it got underway during its formative
early years before receiving approval for the Apollo program as a
national priority.$
In short, NASA was created out of NACA because of President
Eisenhower, James R. Killian aided by James Doolittle and Drygen
and the PSAC members, and Lyndon B. Johnson. Of course, others
helped shape the legislation declaring that U.S. "activities in
outer Space shall be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit
of all mankind." The so-called "reconstituted NACA" called "NASA"
was to pull together probably the greatest single group , of com-
petent engineers in peacetime. The NACA people were not the least
important in the NASA story to date. But they were joined by many
dedicated engineers from other governmental agencies and industry
It was the great goad fortune of NASA that it always had an
Administrator who seemed right for the historical environment of
his time. T. Keith Glennan, James E. Webb, Thomas Paine and James
Fletcher	 each of them are deserving of fuller appreciations,
To get further along in one NASA story, the second phase of
NASA, was dominated by the Apollo goal. About the recommended
decision by President John F. Kennedy to land an American on the
moon in the 1960 1 s, it can be said that it was never considered
4y
7r
r
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other than a NASA job at the highest level.. It was a decision"made
before the first Mercury astronaut flew in space. It was.a decision
pressed by President Kennedy after another Russian space challenge
when an obscuie Red Air Force Major named Yari Gargarin made the
first space flight around the world on April 12, 1961.
President Kennedy had not been a space enthusiast, and had
turned the job of selecting a new NASA Administrator over to Vice
President Lyndon B. Johnson. Johnson had been turned down by 19 to
23 (LBJ used both figures) men unwilling to take 4:he NASA job. There
were some people in high places who felt the Air Force should take
over Project Mercury and most of the U.S. space program. How for--
tunate NASA was to get James E. Webb as its ,second Administrator.
But the role of NASA people in the Apollo lunar-landing decision is
not yet fully known, which I am also working on. The goal was very
simple -- an American on the moon in this decade.lp
It was no accident that NACA people early got the top jobs in
NASA because NACA and ARPA sorted out national space tasks during
the summer of 1958, and before Glennan came aboard. Robert Gilruth
and Abe Silverstein had been detailed by Director Dryden earlier to
saiape the NACA budget and program for the additional space projects
to be transferred. Gilruth:preferred,taking on the manned satellite
program, later called Mercury, while Silverstein became first Director
of Space Flight Program in NASA Headquarters. While T. Keith Glennan
thus inherited a space-going NACA, and all of the projects and pro-
grams transferred immediately into NASA, he started"recruiting the
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the best people possible from outside of NACA.
I shall not have time but for a word on the research engineering
aspects directly transferred from the NACA traditions. With regard
to the reliability of launch vehicles and of spacecraft, a major
effort had to be made to get inherited things working. The Air
Force, Army, and Vanguard boosters did not work very well, which is
true of all first generation new systems. In the space science
and application areas, NASA learned that if a project director was
a scientist, his deputy had better be an engineer; or vice versa.
With regard to manned space flight, the Space Task Group here )at
Langley was always mindful of a man in the loop from NACA experience. 	 x
Rocked; people were experienced in automated systems.' Every consi-
deration had to be made for safe, reliable, and well-defined opera-
tiona l- fail.-safe technology in Project Mercury. The Headquarters
manned space flight office consisted of George Low and Warren North,
in the beginning. It was the point of contact for STG as well as
planning future programs.
Eaziy in 1959, Harry Goett• of Ames was made Chairman of the i
"Research Goals" Committee in NASA Headqu^.rters to shape the guid-
ance to focus the work of all NASA centers. Out of the visits of
j
this Committee to the former NACA laboratories emerged definition of
those critical areas of space flight en gineering requiring definition
and additional research and analysis before NASA could come up with
a sound space program for the next.decade. In short, it was a pro-
cess of getting at the most practical solution of the most critical
problems. Out of the Goett Committee process, additional to studies
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of space flight technology emerged the thrust; the manned lunar
mission appeared the best goal to collate known and unknown know
?edge so that intermediate technology in rockets and spacecraft
would be building blocks ult9,,1;ately a part of a feasible opera-
tional system. Besides stirring the laboratory research and giving
meaning to the important Long Range Plan for space which Congress
and the White House wanteAd for NASA, was the suggestion for the
goal of a manned lunar landing. Early in January 1960, Glennan
gave planning approval for a circumlunar manned mission, and, to
use the ABMA/Marshall Saturn C-2 to fly men around the moon, per-
haps after 1910. This would be the manned program to follow Mercury.
When Silverstein, Gilruth, Low, and others considered how to get
more help in planning how this should be done, Gilruth listed all
of the key problems that remained to be defined -- solar radiation,
re-entry physics from lunar trajectory, and so forth. The conclus-
ion was immediately reached in February 1960 that the NASA labora-
tories had to be-brought into this problem =definition exercise be-
fore guidance for any industry studies coul'd.be contracted which
would be meaningful. As is known„ a . circumlunar..-Project Apollo
was announced in July'1960, as tlfie post-Mercury manned space flight
program.
"With a view to their practical solution" came to the fore
again once the lunar-landing Apollo program got a national priority
and got underway in mid-1961. A whule series of joint technical
panels with the best informed technical participants from all the
NASA centers,including Marshall, Goddard,. and JPL,• played, I would
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submit, an indispensible role in the ultimate Apollo achievement.11
IN RETROSPECT
To the historian, the continuum of the historical experience
of the NACA and NASA fox sixty-years seems indisputable!' The tradi..
Lion of the practical excellence of aeronautical flight research was
made an expanded imperative in space operations of making more com-
plex machines work more reliably in the most hostile environment of
space, Meshing of many disciplines of the sciences and engineering
beyond aeronautics presented a steep learning curve since 1957.
Additionally, knowledge of he space medium itself has been a con-
stant dynamic process of generating practical solutions for newly
appreciated problems.
Is the space Act charter of NASA still valid? To the histor-
ian those who say it is not,-seem unfamiliar with the history of
how we got where we are. In many new ways the challenge of space,
like aeronautics yet too, appears just as challenging if not more
so today than it ever was. There are many others interested in
ecological and other space-related concerns on Earth, and colonizd-
tion or manufacturing in space beyond the sheen attraction of cur-
ious scientists and the exploration of the unknown accessible but
not yet reached. We shall see.
I have talked more about the NACA than NASA, but fifty minutes
to cover sixty-years is still fifty minutes. I did not have time to
change "NAOA" to "NA$A," once doodled by a Director-of the Bureau of
the Budget, and a NACA/NASA engineer, and all the other dimensions
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Iof size and change in our Wstory. But I have focused upon the
factor of t_';me t and trying to give you perspectives on the past
for today.
Perhaps you will now be more mindful that many millions of
people will not forget man's first view of the earth as provided
by the Apollo 8 astronauts, or Neil Armstrong's leap for all man-
kind. Eisenhower's thrust to keep space peaceful has so far been
a reality. Apollo was 'a promise of President Kennedy that came to
pass, which is not a commentary on the batting average of poli"-i-
cans. The Apollo-Soyuz program was more than an experiment in
proving Americans and Russians could get along when they are lofted
into space. These historical milestones of NASA's technical and
even, political experiences in the recent past, shall continue to
help shape future events for they belong to everyone.
There is an il7,ustration of 'how my NACA-NASA theme of "with a
view to their practical solution" can be related to our Bicentennial
perspectives.
1 had the rare privilege of once hearing the great historian
from Richmondr Douglas Southall Freeman, lecture at the Air
University in 1954. He wrote the great biographies of George
'Washington and Robert E. Lee.' Dr. Freeman was talking about leader-
ship. During the question period, he was asked -did Washingt6n
and Lee had anything in common as military leaders? Dr. Freeman
replied that he did not think that George Wa0hington and Robert E.
Lee had anything similar in their makeup, although they both came
-26-
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from Virginia. He thought for a moment, and then said that there
was something that both George Washington and Robert E. Lee had in
common: "They both did little things well."
I would submit that research engineers and scientists, and
managers thereof, would Likely agree that the history of flight
from the Wright brothers to the Viking landing on the planet Mars,
documents that little things ?must be done well and "with a view to
their practical solution." Hopefully, future historians will do
a better job in explaining why and how this was done.
-000-
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